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The  demographic  transition  creates  a  window  of  opportunity  during  which  economies  may 
benefit  from  a  temporary increase  in  the  working  age  share  of  the  population.  While  many 
economies  have already enjoyed these benefits, they remain a promising opportunity for much of 
Sub-Saharan  Africa.  We  show  in  this  paper  that  Sub-Saharan  Africa  adheres  to  the  same 
principles as the rest of the world with respect to the determinants of economic growth, including 
particularly the effects of demographic change. Assuming a policy and institutional context that is 
conducive to economic growth, most Sub-Saharan countries have the potential to reap a sizable 
demographic dividend. 
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paper. Support for this research was provided by grant number 5 P30 AG024409 from the National Institute 
on Aging, National Institutes of Health, and by grants from the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation and 
the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation.     3 
Introduction 
 
Because people’s economic behavior varies at different stages of life, changes in a 
country’s age structure can have significant effects on its economic performance. Nations 
with a high proportion of children are likely to devote a high proportion of resources to their 
care, which tends to depress the pace of economic growth. The effects are similar if a large 
share  of  resources  is  needed  by  a  relatively  less  productive  segment  of  the  elderly.  By 
contrast, if most of a nation’s population falls within the working ages output per capita will 
be high all other factors being equal.   
 
As countries move through the demographic transition from a high fertility and high 
mortality  to  a  low  fertility  and  low  mortality  equilibrium,  the  size  of  the  working  age 
population  mechanically  increases.  This  can  create  virtuous  cycles  of  economic  growth 
commonly referred to as the “demographic dividend”. Bloom, Canning and Sevilla (2003) 
explore this concept of the demographic dividend in detail and compare the variation in the 
age distribution across countries and regions.  
 
Less developed countries have a large proportion of their population in the younger 
age groups as fertility rates are high and life expectancy is low. More developed countries 
have lower fertility rates and higher life expectancy and thus a large proportion of their 
population is at higher ages. Lee (2003) and Weil (1999) examine the projected demographic 
transition and the effect of this transition on economic outcomes respectively. While most 
regions around the world are evolving through the demographic transition Africa stands as an 
outlier. Fertility rates are high and falling only slightly and life expectancy is actually falling 
in some countries due to the impact of HIV/AIDS. Given these trends  Bongaarts and Bulatao     4 
(1999)  have  argued  that  Sub-Saharan  African  countries  are  not  likely  to  earn  the 
demographic dividend. We draw a more differential picture for Sub-Saharan Africa, and 
present a positive outlook for those countries with the right set of institutions in place.  
 
The goal of this paper is to test whether the determinants of growth in general, and 
the effects of demography in particular, are different in Africa than for the rest of the world. 
We show that most Sub-Saharan countries have the potential to reap the benefits of the 
demographic  dividend,  but  that  solid  institutional  settings  will  be  imperative  for  its 
realization. Lee, Lee and Mason (2006) along with Bloom et al. (2003) acknowledge the 
ineffectiveness of the demographic transition in realizing the demographic dividend when 
quality institutions are not in place. We refer to institutions as a general term to include rule 
of law, efficiency of the bureaucracy, corruption, political freedom and expropriation risk, 
openness  (political  system,  trade  barriers,  black  market  premium),  freedom  of  political 
representation and freedom of speech. Despite this list of measures that we capture in the 
institutions measure, a broader measure would include infrastructure (health care systems, 
schooling, roads, transport), and a formal labor market with unions and laws protecting both 
employees and employers.  
 
Without the right policy environment, countries will be too slow to adapt to their 
changing age structure and, at best, will miss an opportunity to secure high growth. At worst, 
where  an  increase  in  the  working-age  population  is  not  matched  by  increased  job 
opportunities, they will face costly penalties, such as rising unemployment and perhaps also 
higher crime rates and political instability. With no policies in place to provide for rising 
numbers  of  old  people,  many  will  face  destitution  in  their  final  years.  Having  a  larger, 
healthier and better-educated workforce will only bear economic fruit if the extra workers     5 
can find jobs. Solid institutions that can gain the confidence of the population and markets 
alike may help countries to reap the potential benefit created by their demographic transition.  
 
Poor rule of law discourages investment as contracts are not reliably enforceable. 
Corruption and inefficient bureaucracy create difficulties and uncertainties in establishing 
enterprise or gaining and maintaining employment. The lack of political freedom and high 
expropriation risk lead to short sighted behavior and undermine long term investment. Thus, 
a poor institutional environment critically affects the potential gains from the demographic 
transition.  
 
A  healthy  degree  of  flexibility  in  labor  markets  is  also  vital  if  a  country  is  to 
accommodate a burgeoning working-age population. Flexibility means that employers are 
able to rapidly expand and contract their businesses, to shift workers from one area of the 
business  to  another,  and  to  raise  and  lower  pay  more  easily.  Flexibility  also  means  a 
workforce  that  is  able  to  adapt  its  working  patterns  as  the  business  environment  shifts. 
Flexibility can be difficult to sell to a workforce, as employers are commonly thought to reap 
the benefits while employees bear the costs. However, the provision of adequate safety nets 
and generous re-training programs can help persuade workers to become less risk-averse. 
Although recent history shows that designing and implementing effective programs along 
these lines is a challenging task in low- and middle-income countries, the incentives for 
proceeding  in  this  direction  are  substantial.  Many  wealthy  industrial  countries  have 
successful programs that provide a good starting point for thinking both conventionally and 
imaginatively along these lines.  
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Comparing  key  economic  and  demographic  statistics  of  the  Sub-Saharan  African 
countries to the rest of the world (ROW) highlights the particularity of the region. Given 
these structural differences, it is not clear whether the African countries follow the global 
growth dynamics. Sachs and Warner (1997) find that the determinants of economic growth in 
Africa are no different from those for the rest of the world. Moreover, they find that the lack 
of  openness  and  poor  economic  policies  are  at  the  root  of  Africa’s  dismal  economic 
performance within the 1965-1990 sample period they use. Since the publication of the Sachs 
and Warner (1997) article, many African countries, such as in Mali, South Africa, Niger, 
Mozambique, Cameroon, Madagascar, and Uganda, have improved their institutional quality, 
and fertility rates in many African countries have begun to fall, potentially initiating the 
demographic transition. 
 
However, despite some recent decreases, fertility  rates in many African countries 
remain high relative to the rest of the world. There are various reasons for high fertility. With 
limited  financial  infrastructure  in  rural  areas  offering  little  incentive  or  means  to  save, 
children are still viewed as insurance against old age. They are also a key source of labor. 
Furthermore, and despite medical advances, infectious disease is still widespread, particularly 
in rural areas, so cultural norms and policies encouraging high fertility in order to achieve 
desired family sizes (such as child fosterage, polygyny and the distribution of land according 
to family size) are changing only slowly. 
 
In the last 40 years Africa has faced a series of prolonged and debilitating wars. Wars 
not only kill and injure soldiers and civilians alike; they also destroy infrastructure and social 
structures, thus destroying the foundation on which the demographic transition can be of 
benefit to the economy.      7 
 
Another  aspect  of  the  problems  facing  Sub-Saharan  Africa  is  the  prevalence  and 
virulence of infectious diseases. Despite some impressive health gains over the last century, 
malaria, HIV/AIDS, and TB are just three of the big killers that are not yet successfully 
controlled. Malaria and HIV alone currently account for 3-4 million of Sub-Saharan Africa’s 
roughly 10 million annual deaths. HIV is particularly prevalent in Sub-Saharan Africa, where 
many countries have ten or more people living with HIV for each person who has already 
died from the disease. Between 1985 and 1995, more than 4 million Sub-Saharan Africans 
died of AIDS. By 2005 it was estimated that fifteen million more deaths had occurred, with 
70% of the world’s new infections and 80% of AIDS deaths in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
Furthermore, in addition to children and the elderly as dependents, many  will be 
suffering  the  ravages  of  HIV  in  adulthood.  Heterosexual  sex  is  the  dominant  means  of 
transmission, and the majority of people dying of AIDS are between 20 and 59 years of age. 
In  other  words,  it  is  a  disease  that  particularly  hits  those  who  should  be  economically 
productive, and threatens not only health, but also the economic stability and potential of a 
country. 
 
Despite the long list of challenges to be faced, our outlook on economic growth in 
Sub-Saharan countries over the next 20 years is rather positive. Given our past estimates of 
economic growth, current institutional settings and demographers’ population forecasts, we 
argue  that  Ghana,  Ivory  Coast,  Malawi,  Mozambique,  and  Namibia  have  a  very  high 
potential to profit from the demographic dividend over the next 20 years. Our growth outlook 
is also very positive for South Africa and Botswana as current regional leaders in terms of     8 
their  institutional  quality,  even  though  their  prospects  for  profiting  from  a  demographic 
dividend over the next two decades are rather small. 
 
Senegal, Cameroon, Tanzania, Togo and Nigeria are projected to have very strong 
growth  of  the  share  of  the  working  age  population,  but  still  suffer  from  institutional 
deficiencies. Given the importance of institutional quality as a catalyst for converting growth 
of the working age share into a demographic dividend, it is hard to tell the degree to which 
these countries will be able to gain from the demographic dividend.  
 
In the section that follows we explain the model and data used to identify whether the 
determinants of economic growth are different in Sub-Saharan Africa compared to the rest of 
the world. Then we decipher the role of institutions coupled with the demographic transition 
that can lead to a realization of the demographic dividend. We then use projections of the 
growth  of  the  working  age  share  to  identify  which  countries  stand  to  benefit  from  the 
demographic dividend. In the last section of the paper we discuss the results and provide 
conclusions.  
 
Model, Data and Empirical Results 
 
Our empirical strategy consists of three parts. In the first part of the empirical section, 
we estimate the basic relation between demography and economic growth. Denoting income 




=   (0.1) 
where WAis the number of working age people. Taking logs      9 




= = =   (0.2) 
 
we can express the steady state level of income per capita as  
  * * , y z w x w β = + = +   (0.3) 
wherexis the matrix containing the variables determining steady state income per working 
age person.  Following Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2003) economic growth occurs as each 
country converges from its initial position to its steady state. In our case, this is conditional 
on the variables  xand w, so that growth in every period is given by:  
  1 1 ( * ) ( ) y y y x w y λ λ β − − ∆ = − = + −   (0.4) 
The steady state determines the end of period equilibrium of the economy and can 
change during the growth period considered. Let us suppose that we can write a structural 
model as: 
  1 1 2 3 1 2 1 3 , x x w y w x w y α α α γ γ γ − − = + + = + +   (0.5) 
Then we can derive the reduced form 
  1 1 1 2 1 3 1 ( * ) y y y x w y λ δ δ δ − − − − ∆ = − = + +   (0.6) 
where the reduced form coefficients δ are combinations of the structural coefficients 
from equations (0.7) and (0.8). Taking five year growth rates as our dependent variable we 
first estimate a standard growth model as described in equation (0.9)  for the full sample of 
countries. In a second step, we divide our sample into Sub-Saharan and non Sub-Saharan 
countries, and test whether there are significant differences in the estimated coefficients.  
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In  the  second  part  of  the  empirical  section,  we  use  the  estimated  coefficients  in 
combination with population forecasts from the United Nations to gauge the magnitude of the 




We use a five year panel covering the years 1960 to 2000. We limit our data set to 
those countries where all explanatory variables are available, which leaves us with a sample 
of 85 countries, out of which 19 are located in the Sub-Saharan zone
2. We then use our 
estimates for out-of-sample economic growth projections using an extended set of countries.  
 
Data on national income are from the Penn World Tables mark 6.2, data on working 
age share from the United Nations’ World Population Prospects 2004. We add additional 
variables from different data sources: schooling data are from Barro and Lee (2000), life 
expectancy  from  the  World  Development  Indicators  (World  Bank  2006),  ethnic 
fractionalization  data  from  Alesina,  Devleeschauwer,  Kurlat  and  Wacziarg  (2003),  and 
institutional quality data from Knack and Keefer (1995), Sachs and Warner (1997), Wacziarg 
and Welsh (2003) and the World Bank (2007) 
 
In Table 1, we provide separate descriptive statistics for Sub-Saharan countries and 
the  rest  of  our  sample  (which  we  refer  to  as  rest  of  the  world  or  ROW).  Pronounced 
differences are visible across all dimensions.  
 
                                                 
2 For a full list of countries, please see appendix.     11 
The average income per capita in Sub-Saharan countries over the sample period was 
US$ 1,850, and the average annual growth rate a bleak 0.5% per year. Comparing this to the 
average income of US$ 9,393 and an average growth rate of 2.3% for the rest of the world
3 
portrays a rather bleak picture of the average Sub-Saharan economic development over the 
last decades. The differences between Sub-Saharan countries and the rest of our sample are 
visible across all explanatory variables typically applied in growth regressions: on average, 
Sub-Saharan countries display significantly lower levels of schooling and life expectancy, 
have  poorer  institutions,  higher  degrees  of  ethnic  fractionalization,  a  lower  degree  of 
openness, and have a higher chance of being land-locked and in a tropical zone than the 
average non Sub-Saharan country in our sample.  
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics Sub-Samples 
 
  Sub-Saharan Countries  Non-Sub-Saharan 
Countries 
Variable  Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev  
Year  124  1985  10.6  486  1983  11.2 
GDP per capita  124  1850  1760  486  9393  7348 
5 year growth in GDP per 
capita 
124  .026  .229  486  .116  .136 
Openness  124  .209  .409  486  .591  .492 
Institutions  124  19.47  4.60  486  26.25  7.62 
Ethnic Fractionalization  124  .728  .141  486  .336  .224 
Landlocked  124  .395  .491  486  .078  .269 
Tropical  124  .916  .242  486  .388  .460 
Average years of schooling   124  2.29  1.55  486  5.72  2.76 
Life expectancy  124  48.74  7.15  486  68.41  7.91 
Working Age Share  124  51.63  2.71  486  59.67  6.14 
Growth in Working Age 
share (5 year) 
124  .001  .019  486  .014  .024 
                                                 
3 Note that the economic growth figures are five year averages.     12 
 
 
Most importantly for the purpose of this paper, the average working age share of the 
total population is 8 percentage points lower in Sub-Saharan countries than in the rest of the 
world, with the average growth rate of the being close to zero over the sample period. 
 
Part I: Estimating the Demographic Dividend 
 
We start by estimating the basic growth model outlined in section 2. To capture 
different steady states across countries, we introduce an extended set of control variables, 
including, institutional quality, ethnic fractionalization, schooling, life expectancy and two 
dummy variables that indicate whether a country lies in a tropical zone and is landlocked. 
The main variables of interest are the log of the size of the working age population (WAS) as 
well as its growth. 
 
The main results are summarized in Table 2 below. In column 1, we estimate our 
basic  model  with  OLS.  Out  of  the  set  of  control  variables  our  measures  of  institutional 
quality, life expectancy and ethnic fractionalization appear to have the most significant effect 
on  growth.  The  lagged  level  of  income  enters  with  a  negative  and  highly  significant 
coefficient,  consistent  with  our  basic  convergence  assumption.  As  to  the  demographic 
variables, our results strongly confirm our priors: both the level of the working age share and 
its growth enter the growth equation with a positive and highly significant sign. 
 
The negative and non-significant effect of schooling is orthogonal to our prior. We 
try  alternative  specifications  where  we  interact  the  schooling  variable  with  institutional     13 
quality  and  growth  of  the  working  age  share  ─  without  different  results.  One  possible 
explanation for the insignificance of schooling in our empirical work may be measurement 
error in the schooling data. Another explanation may lie in the high degree of collinearity in 
the  data;  the  correlation  between  initial  income,  initial  life  expectancy  and  institutional 
quality are all larger than 0.75. 
 
To control for the interdependence of the growth in working age share and economic 
growth, we use instrument for the growth in working age share in columns 2 and 3 of the 
Table. The instrument we use is lagged growth in WAS, which works well as a predictor of 
WAS  growth  due  to  the  slow  moving  character  of  the  variable,  and  can  be  considered 
predetermined in the main equation. As shown in column 2 of Table 2, the IV estimates on 
the growth in working age share are significantly larger than the ones obtained by OLS. This 
could reflect measurement error, or may be interpreted as evidence for a negative causal 
effect from economic growth to the growth in WAS. 
 
  In column 3, we test whether the positive growth effects of the demographic dividend 
are conditional on the institutional quality of a country as suggested by Bloom and Canning 
(2003); our results strongly confirm this hypothesis. Interacting the growth in working age 
population with institutional quality, we  find the interaction term to have a positive and 
highly significant effect, while the growth in working age share itself is no longer significant. 
This is an important result, as it implies that only countries featuring high institutional quality 
are able to receive a demographic dividend. The estimated size of the institutional effect on 
growth is large. Taking a non Sub-Saharan country with an average growth of working age 
population (0.014), a two standard deviation increase in institutional quality (15.2) increases 
economic growth by about 2% per year. Three quarters of this effect is due to the direct effect     14 
of  institutions  on  growth;  one  quarter,  or  half  a  percent  growth  per  year,  is  due  to  the 
interaction of institutions with the growth in the working age share. 
 
  Given the strong differences between Sub-Sahara and ROW, one may question the 
applicability  of  this  basic  result  to  the  Sub-Saharan  region,  and  argue  that  Sub-Saharan 
countries follow different patters. To test this hypothesis, we separately estimate the model 
specified in column 3 for the two sub samples, and test whether the estimated coefficients 
differ significantly between the two sub samples. We perform both Wald tests for each single 
coefficient being the same across sample, and a Chow test for all coefficients being the same 
across the two samples. The results of this test are displayed in the last column of Table 2. 
According  to  our  analysis,  the  coefficient  on  initial  GDP  per  capita  is  the  only  one 
significantly different across samples. The absolute value of the coefficient on initial GDP is 
higher  in  Sub-Saharan  Africa  than  the  rest  of  the  world,  implying  more  rapid  income 
convergence in this region. For all other variables, the null hypothesis of equal coefficient 
can not be rejected at standard confidence intervals.      15 
 
    
Table 2: Economic Growth and the Demographic Dividend 
  Dependent Variable: 5 Year Economic Growth 
Rate 
 
         
Wald Test
1) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)   
Openness  0.036**  0.026  0.018  1.43 
  (2.37)  (1.52)  (1.00)  (0.23) 
Institutions  0.006***  0.007***  0.005***  0.02 
  (3.36)  (3.38)  (2.61)  (0.88) 
Ethnic Fractionalization  -0.064***  -0.068***  -0.080***  1.55 
  (2.64)  (2.66)  (3.02)  (0.21) 
Land Locked Country  0.005  0.016  0.013  0.66 
  (0.28)  (0.88)  (0.72)  (0.42) 
Tropical Country  -0.007  -0.006  -0.005  2.38 
  (0.37)  (0.28)  (0.28)  (0.12) 
Avg. Years of Schooling  -0.007  -0.007  -0.008  0.05 
  (1.61)  (1.57)  (1.62)  0.82 
Life Expectancy  0.007***  0.006***  0.007***  2.00 
  (4.82)  (3.79)  (4.00)  (0.16) 
Initial GDP  -0.117***  -0.128***  -0.130***  3.21* 
  (5.29)  (5.44)  (5.51)  (0.07) 
Log(Working Age Share)  0.378***  0.540***  0.505***  0.19 
  (3.59)  (4.64)  (4.23)  (0.67) 
Growth in WAS  0.804***  1.538***  -2.002  0.43 
  (2.94)  (3.20)  (1.02)  (0.51) 
Growth in WAS *Institutions      0.139**  0.40 
      (1.98)  (0.53) 
Constant  -0.919**  -1.437***  -1.299***  0.00 
  (2.30)  (3.30)  (2.88)  (0.96) 
         
Time Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Chow Test: 
Country Fixed Effects  No  No  No  49.85*** 
Estimation  OLS  2SLS  2SLS  (0.00) 
Sample  Full Sample  Full Sample  Full Sample  Full Sample 
         
Observations  610  554  554  554 
R-squared  0.32  0.37  0.37  0.37 
Notes: 
Robust t statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
1) Wald test H0: Coefficient identical for Sub-Saharan sub sample and non Sub-Saharan  sample. We 
report the chi
2 statistics, with p-values in parenthesis. 
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Part II: Implications  
 
Two  main  results  emerge  from  our  empirical  analysis:  First,  the  effects  of 
demographic change on economic growth are sizeable, but contingent on good institutions. 
Second, the estimated relation between demographic variables and economic growth appears 
to be constant across samples, and thus to apply to Sub-Saharan countries as much as to any 
other country in the world. A closer look at the Sub-Saharan countries in our sample confirms 
this finding. As shown in Figure 1, the relationship between demographic developments and 
economic growth over the last 20 years appears quite robust. With the exception of Uganda 
and Mali, which showed high growth rates despite negative growth in the working age share 
due to excellent policy reforms, all countries with positive economic growth rates have also 
seen positive growth rates in their working age population. 
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What are the implications for the growth prospects in Sub-Saharan countries? Given 
our  results,  the  answer  to  this  question  depends  on  two  country  specific  factors:  future 
developments in population structure and institutional quality. Institutional quality is hard to 
define, and even harder to measure; to provide the most complete measure possible, we 
display four different measures of institutional quality in Table 3 below. Column 1 shows the 
average combined score each country reached in the International Country Risk Guide over 
the period 1982-1997 (Knack and Keefer 1995). The total score is the aggregation of the 
scores of five different subcategories: rule of law, efficiency of the bureaucracy, government 
stability, corruption and expropriation risk. Column 2 shows the institutional quality measure 
as determined by the Polity IV project. The score ranges from -10 (worst) to +10 (best). 
Column  3  shows  the  position  of  each  country  in  the  World  Bank’s  recent  business 
environment ranking (World Bank 2007). The ranking is based on business surveys, and 
measures the general difficulty of doing business in a country. Column 4 shows the latest 
version of the openness variable originally introduced by Sachs and Warner (1997), and 
updated by Wacziarg and Welsh (2003). A country is considered closed if average tariff rates 
are above 40%, non-tariff barriers cover 40% or more of trade, black market exchange rates 
depreciated  by  20%  or  more relative  to the  official  exchange,  if  the  country  has  a  state 
monopoly on major exports, or the country has a socialist economic system.  Although there 
is some variation in the absolute rankings, the relative position of countries looks relatively 
similar across the categories. South Africa, Namibia and Botswana appear to have the best 
institutions independent of the measure applied, while Sudan and the Republic of the Congo 
get the worst evaluations. 
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South Africa  28.57  9  29  1  1.25 
Botswana  27.21  9  48  1  2 
Namibia  23.8  6  42  -  7.75 
Cote d'Ivoire  23.86  4  141  1  8 
Mozambique  21.64  6  140  1  8 
Ghana  19.98  2  94  1  8.25 
Kenya  22.28  -2  83  1  8.75 
Madagascar  17.65  7  149  1  11.25 
Malawi  20.47  7  110  0  11.5 
Gambia, The  23.08  -5  132  1  12.5 
Niger  19.96  4  160  1  13.25 
Gabon  22.14  -4  31  0  13.75 
Senegal  19.18  8  146  0  14 
Cameroon  21.87  -4  152  1  14.25 
Ethiopia  17.84  1  97  0  14.75 
Mali  12.4  6  155  1  14.75 
Tanzania  21.27  2  142  0  14.75 
Nigeria  16.11  4  108  0  15.5 
Uganda  14.99  -4  107  1  15.5 
Guinea  19.54  -1  157  1  15.75 
Zambia  17.21  1  102  0  15.75 
Guinea-Bissau  13.62  5  173  1  17 
Burkina Faso  19.22  -3  163  1  17.5 
Liberia  8.98  0  -  0  19.75 
Somalia  12.06  0  -  0  19.75 
Togo  17.67  -2  151  0  20 
Zimbabwe  20.57  -5  153  0  20 
Angola  17.75  -3  156  0  21.5 
Sierra Leone  16.05  0  168  0  23 
Congo, Dem. Rep.  9.84  0  175  0  24.75 
Sudan  11.96  -7  154  -  25.25 
Congo, Rep.  16.99  -6  171  0  25.5 
Non-Sub-Saharan   25.39  3.88  80  0.78  - 
United States  36.25  10  3  1  - 
Notes: 
1) Source: The Polity IV Project, http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/polity/. Reference year is 2000. 
2) The World Bank Business Environment database. http://www.doingbusiness.org/. Reference year is 2005. 
3) Source: Wacziarg and Horn Welsh (2003). Openness measure reflect the average score 1990 to 1999. 
4.) Average ranking in columns 2-5. 
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To get a simple measure of a country’s overall evaluation, we show the average 
ranking (among Sub-Saharan countries in our sample) in the four categories in column 5.  
 
Table 4: Forecasted Growth in the Working Age Population; Institutional Ranking 
 















Senegal  52.19  0.64  0.68  14 
Cameroon  53.54  0.66  0.63  14.25 
Tanzania  52.94  0.59  0.62  14.75 
Togo  52.39  0.55  0.62  20 
Nigeria  51.76  0.52  0.59  15.5 
Madagascar  52.17  0.58  0.57  11.25 
Cote d'Ivoire  53.72  0.57  0.56  8 
Gabon  53.51  0.77  0.54  13.75 
Gambia, The  55.34  0.46  0.52  12.5 
Sudan  56.18  0.51  0.52  25.25 
Ghana  55.37  0.54  0.51  8.25 
Namibia  53.09  1.06  0.51  7.75 
Ethiopia  51.62  0.48  0.50  14.75 
Malawi  50.81  0.45  0.46  11.5 
Zambia  50.67  0.38  0.46  15.75 
Mozambique  52.61  0.40  0.45  8 
Mali  48.8  0.35  0.44  14.75 
Burkina Faso  48.65  0.33  0.43  17.5 
Guinea  52.66  0.26  0.41  15.75 
Kenya  53.1  0.04  0.39  8.75 
Somalia  53.38  0.19  0.36  19.75 
Zimbabwe  54.09  0.50  0.35  20 
Niger  49.02  0.22  0.27  13.25 
Angola  50.52  0.19  0.26  21.5 
Uganda  47.08  -0.03  0.20  15.5 
Congo, Rep.  50.39  -0.02  0.18  25.5 
Congo, Dem. Rep.  50.23  -0.12  0.15  24.75 
Guinea-Bissau  50.07  -0.04  0.14  17 
Sierra Leone  53.95  0.00  0.14  23 
Liberia  50.86  -0.15  0.07  19.75 
Botswana  58.13  0.25  0.05  2 
South Africa  62.84  0.09  0.02  1.25 
US  66.10  -0.11  -0.25   
Non-Subsaharan  63.37  0.24  0.07   
Notes: 
1) Fraction of the population in the age group 15-64. World Population Prospects 2004. 
2) Forecast from World Populations Prospects 2005, medium scenario. 
3) Average ranking within Sub-Saharan countries, see previous table. 
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The  lower  the  aggregate  score,  the  better  the  overall  evaluation  of  the  country’s 
institutions, and the more positive is thus the growth outlook for the given country. Cohort 
specific population growth rates are calculated on a regular basis by the United Nations 
and  published  in  the  World  Population  Prospects  (2004).  Table  4  summarizes  the 
forecasts for the intermediate growth scenario.  Column 2 of Table 4 shows the current 
share of the working age population, while columns 3 and 4 show the expected growth in 
working age population share over the period 2005-2015 and 2005-2025, respectively. The 
countries with the highest expected growth in working age share are Senegal, Cameroon, 
Tanzania; the countries with the lowest rates are Botswana and South Africa, whose working 
age population is expected to grow only very moderately over the next 20 years. In the last 
column, we show the aggregate institutional score. Quite strikingly, the five countries with 
the highest expected rate of growth of working-age share are all characterized by medium to 
low  quality  institutions.  The  countries  that  do  relatively  well  on  both  dimensions  are 




Discussion and Conclusion 
 
The  descriptive  statistics  in  Table  1  illustrate  the  dismal  economic,  social  and 
geographic predicament of Africa compared to the rest of the world. Current GDP per capita 
amounts to one fifth of that in ROW, average years of schooling are at 40% of ROW levels, 
and average life expectancy is 20 years lower. Moreover, the average institutional quality in 
Africa lags significantly behind the average in ROW. Given this pronounced lag one might 
argue  that  Africa  is  simply  different  from  ROW  and  claim  that  the  factors  determining     21 
economic development in Africa diverge from those of ROW. We find no evidence for this 
claim. Our results imply that the standard economic growth model equally applies to Sub-
Saharan countries as it does to other regions in the world in general and with respect to the 
demographic dividend in particular.  
 
  As discussed in the introduction, the demographic transition from high fertility and 
low  life  expectancy  to  low  fertility  and  high  life  expectancy  does  not  guarantee  a 
demographic  dividend.  A  stable  and  transparent  political  and  economic  environment  is 
required for individuals in the working-age population to be productive. Efficiency losses due 
to poor institutional quality will outweigh any gains that a high proportion of working-age 
population can bring. Our results show that the demographic transition does have an effect on 
economic growth, but only when coupled with institutional quality.  
 
  From a demographic perspective, the prospects for earning the demographic dividend 
and spur economic growth look good. As shown in Table 4, the United Nations predict 
significant increases in the working age share for close to all countries in the Sub-Saharan 
region. Africa stands on the cusp of the demographic transition, but good institutions will be 
needed to earn the demographic dividend. As of today, our results make us most optimistic 
for Ghana, Ivory Coast, Malawi, Mozambique and Namibia, who have done relatively well 
on the institutional side and significant increases in working age share coming up over the 
next 20 years. Cameroon, Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania and Togo have the greatest potential for 
increased  economic  growth  from  a  demographic  point  of  view,  but  will  likely  have  to 
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Appendix 
 
Sub-Saharan Sample Country List 
 
Botswana, Cameroon, Congo(Dem. Rep.), Congo (Rep.), Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, 
Malawi,  Mali,  Mozambique,  Niger,  Senegal,  Sierra  Leone,  South  Africa,  Togo,  Uganda, 
Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
 
Non-Sub-Saharan Sample Country List 
 
Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, 
China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt (Arab 
Rep.), El Salvador, Finland, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, 
India, Indonesia, Iran, Islamic Rep., Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Korea, 
Rep., Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, 
Panama,  Papua  New  Guinea,  Paraguay,  Peru,  Philippines,  Poland,  Portugal,  Singapore, 
Spain,  Sri  Lanka,  Sweden,  Switzerland,  Syrian  Arab  Republic,  Thailand,  Trinidad  and 
Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela.  
 
 